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Abstract—In order to effectively interact with or supervise
a robot, humans need to have an accurate mental model of its
capabilities and how it acts. Learned neural network policies
make that particularly challenging. We propose an approach
for helping end-users build a mental model of such policies.
Our key observation is that for most tasks, the essence of the
policy is captured in a few critical states: states in which it is
very important to take a certain action. Our user studies show
that if the robot shows a human what its understanding of
the task’s critical states is, then the human can make a more
informed decision about whether to deploy the policy, and if
she does deploy it, when she needs to take control from it at
execution time.
I. INTRODUCTION
When humans have an accurate mental model of a robot,
their subsequent interactions with this robot are safer and
more seamless. This mental model may include the robot’s
intentions [1], [2], [3], its objectives [4], its capabilities [5],
[6], or its decision-making process [7].
In particular, giving human end-users an accurate mental
model of a robot’s capabilities is key to establishing an ap-
propriate level of trust in the robot [8], [9], [10]. Establishing
appropriate levels of trust in robots is essential: if end-
users do not trust a robot, they may unnecessarily interfere
with its operation, and will fail to take advantage of all its
capabilities [11]. On the other hand, if end-users over-trust
a robot, they will expect it to act correctly in situations that
it in fact cannot handle, which leads to unexpected behavior,
and perhaps injuries and damage. As robots become more
capable, they may unintentionally lead humans to over-trust
them [12]. In general, trust is a complex phenomenon, and
there are a variety of ways in which robots and machines
may influence human end-users’ trust [13], [14], [15].
Establishing appropriate trust is particularly challenging
when the robot has learned a complex black-box policy. For
instance, recently neural network policies have been trained
to perform robotic manipulation skills [16] and drive in the
real world [17]. These neural networks are trained end-to-
end to map directly from raw inputs (e.g., images) to a
distribution over actions to take. To decide how much to
trust a learned policy, we have to know whether the robot has
figured out the correct actions to take. But, it is impossible
to examine what the robot plans to do in every possible state.
Our insight is that the end-user does not need to know
what the robot would do in all states. For many tasks, in most
states the ultimate outcome of the task is similar, regardless
of which action the robot takes locally. But there are a few
states—critical states—where it really matters which action
the robot takes.
Critical States do not deploy,
because of
deploy, but
take control at
Fig. 1. By introducing human end-users to a policy pi’s critical states Cpi
(left), we enable them to make a more informed decision about whether to
deploy the policy, and when to take control from it. For example, suppose
that a self-driving car’s policy believes it is critical to stop when it encounters
red lights, a pedestrian crossing a crosswalk, and an empty crosswalk. An
end-user (top right) might see these critical states and decide not to ride
in this car, because the last critical state is clearly incorrect. A different
end-user (bottom right) might be comfortable riding in this car, but will be
more aware of possibly needing to take control when there is a pedestrian
crossing the road without a crosswalk in sight, because the policy did not
consider that to be a critical state.
For instance, imagine an autonomous car driving down
a highway. When there are no vehicles nearby, it does not
matter whether the car maintains its current speed, speeds
up or slows down slightly, or turns slightly to the right or
left. In contrast, if the vehicle directly in front slams on its
brakes, the autonomous car must immediately slow down as
well. The latter is a critical state, whereas the former is not.
Usually when end-users are introduced to a robot, they are
only told summary statistics of this robot’s performance. For
instance, a potential passenger may be told that a particular
autonomous car has driven more than a million miles,
without causing any accidents. Without more information,
this passenger has no way of knowing what kinds of states
this car still cannot handle. If she expects the autonomous
car to do the right thing in a critical state, and it does not,
then it may be too late to recover.
As end-users observe and interact with a robot over time,
they will gradually improve their mental model of it [18], just
as they do when observing other humans [19], [20]. However,
it may take a while for end-users to learn a sufficiently-
accurate mental model in this way. The hope is that we
can speed up this process by exposing humans to more
informative examples of the robot’s behavior.
To this end, we propose showing end-users how the robot
acts in critical states, to give them a better understanding
of what it has learned, and enable them to decide which
situations to trust the robot in (Fig. 1). After seeing how a
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robot acts in critical states, a potential user may decide that
this robot is not trustworthy, and decline to use it. Or, in
human-in-the-loop setups—for instance, a passenger riding
in a self-driving car, or an engineer supervising robot arms
in a factory—this ensures users are well-equipped to decide
when they need to take control over the robot’s operation.
Our main contribution is a method for algorithmic assur-
ance [21], that enables end-users to more quickly establish
an appropriate level of trust in robots that they interact
with, rely on, or supervise. Our user studies suggest that
humans are indeed able to develop more appropriate trust in
a robot through observing how it acts in what it considers
to be critical states, compared to just observing it act over
time. We evaluate this through both self-reported measures
of trust, as well as through allowing users to take control
during execution of the policy [11]: if they have developed
an appropriate level of trust, they would only choose to take
control in critical states that the robot likely cannot handle.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Notation
We consider the setting of a Markov Decision Process
(MDP), defined by {S,A,P,R, γ}, where S is the state
space, A the action space, P : S×A×S → R the transition
probabilities, R : S ×A× S → R the reward function, and
γ ∈ (0, 1] the discount factor.
A robot’s policy pi is a stochastic function mapping each
state to a distribution over actions (pi : S → ∆A, where ∆A
is the probability simplex on A). Its value function at state
s is
V pi(s) = max
a
∫
s′
P (s, a, s′)[R(s, a, s′) + γV pi(s′)], (1)
and its action-value function at state s and taking action a is
Qpi(s, a) =
∫
s′
P (s, a, s′)[R(s, a, s′) + γmax
a′
Qpi(s′, a′)].
(2)
In this framework, a critical state s is one for which
Qpi(s, a) varies greatly across different actions a: there are
a small number of actions for which Qpi(s, ·) is high, but
for most actions it is mediocre or low. We will define this
formally in the next section.
B. Maximum-Entropy Reinforcement Learning
Typically a robot’s goal is to maximize expected cumula-
tive discounted reward, or return:
Epi,P
[∑
t
γtR(st, at, st+1)
]
. (3)
Depending on the MDP, this may result in policies that are
essentially deterministic, treating all states as critical.
In contrast, in maximum-entropy reinforcement learning,
the policy is trained to not only maximize return, but also to
act as randomly as possible while doing so [22], [23], [24].
Concretely, the policy is trained to maximize
Epi,P
[∑
t
γt[R(st, at, st+1) + αH(pi(·|st))]
]
, (4)
where α determines the tradeoff between maximizing return
and entropy, and H(pi(·|st)) is the entropy of the policy’s
output action distribution at state st. This leads to a policy
with meaningful critical states, since it learns to acts ran-
domly in states where the action has little impact on return,
and to act purposefully in states where the action does have
a major impact on return.
We train our neural network policies using Soft Actor-
Critic1 (SAC) [24], a deep reinforcement learning method
that is based on maximum entropy reinforcement learning.
We find that in practice, training with SAC indeed produces
policies with meaningful critical states.
III. COMPUTING AND USING CRITICAL STATES
A. Computation of Critical States
Policy-Based. Recall that critical states are those in which
a policy (or human) greatly prefers a small set of possible
actions over all others. A natural definition of the set of
critical states Cpi for a stochastic policy pi is thus
Cpi = {s |H(pi(·|s)) < t}, (5)
where H(pi(·|s)) is the entropy of the policy’s output action
distribution at state s, and t ∈ R is the threshold for being
considered “critical.” This definition of critical states can be
applied to both continuous and discrete action spaces.
Value-Based. Certain reinforcement learning approaches for
training policies, such as actor-critic methods, also learn a
value or action-value function in parallel to (or instead of)
learning a policy [25]. Value functions capture the long-
term consequences of a policy’s actions, so when they are
available, they are a reasonable alternative for computing
critical states.
If we define critical states more concretely as those in
which acting randomly will produce a much worse result
than acting optimally, then the set of critical states Cpi for a
stochastic policy pi is:
Cpi = {s | (max
a
Qpi(s, a)− 1|A|
∑
a
Qpi(s, a)) > t}, (6)
where Qpi is the learned action-value function. If the action
space is continuous, this can be applied after discretization.
Computing critical states based on a learned value function
V pi is also possible, by using one-step rollouts to estimate
Qpi for each action.
We train our policies with SAC, which learns a policy
and an action-value function in parallel. In practice, we
found that computing critical states based on action-value
functions was more reliable, because the policy may learn to
exploit environment characteristics (e.g., action clipping) to
maximize entropy.
Note that with either of these two approaches, computing
the critical states of a policy is agnostic to the implementation
of the policy itself; only access to either the policy’s or
action-value function’s output is required, so this can be
directly applied to black-box policies.
1We use the implementation at github.com/haarnoja/sac.
Query States
Critical States
correct
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Fig. 2. The query states and sets of critical states Cpi shown in our user study for Pong. The policy controls the yellow paddle. Query states s1 through
s4 are not critical, because the paddle has plenty of time to reach the ball, whereas s5 and s6 are. The colored bars indicate which states are included
in each possible Cpi . For example, the incorrect-action Cpi contains one correct critical state (the leftmost one) and one incorrect-action critical state (the
rightmost one). The false-negative Cpi contains one correct critical state, but is missing the second correct critical state—so the corresponding policy would
likely miss balls heading toward it from above. Each possible Cpi contains at least one correct critical state (the leftmost one).
B. Using Critical States
We assume a human expert at the task. Let Ch be the set
of (ground-truth) states that she considers critical. We do not
know what Ch is—and, in fact, this may differ across human
end-users—so we cannot check whether Cpi and Ch are the
same. However, what we can do is expose the human to Cpi .
Below, we describe the interaction we envision.
Decline to deploy due to false positives, false negatives,
or incorrect actions. Before using a robot that has learned a
policy pi, the human end-user first gets to observe its actions
in the states it considers as critical, Cpi . If the human spots
false-positive or false-negative critical states (i.e., states that
are in Cpi but not in Ch or vice versa), then she can decline
to deploy the robot. False-negative critical states happen,
for instance, when an autonomous car does not realize that
stopping for a red light is a critical state. False-positive
critical states happen, for instance, when an autonomous
car considers it critical to slow down, even if there is quite
a bit of space left to the car in front. Both false-negative
and false-positive critical states indicate that the robot has
failed to learn something fundamental about the task, and
thus perhaps should not be trusted. Similarly, if the policy
identifies a true-positive critical state but is mistaken about
which action is correct in that state, then the end-user will
observe that and not trust the policy as a result.
Take control. We are also interested in the case where Cpi
does not have any obvious false-positive, false-negative, or
incorrect-action critical states, and the user decides to go
ahead and deploy the robot, but the robot operates with the
user in the loop. At execution time the user is able to take
control from the policy whenever she deems it necessary.
Because she has already observed how the policy acts for
states in Cpi , the user is better equipped to take control from
the policy when necessary, and refrain from doing so when
not necessary.
C. Justification of Critical States
The user should have enough information based on critical
states to take control when necessary at execution time. Note
that at execution time, any state s encountered by the robot
must fall into one of three cases: (1) s 6∈ Ch, (2) s ∈ Ch and
s ∈ Cpi , or (3) s ∈ Ch and s 6∈ Cpi .
In case (1), the user does not consider this state to be
critical, so by definition she does not care which action
the policy chooses and will refrain from taking control. In
contrast, in cases (2) and (3), the user does consider this state
to be critical, and cares about which action the policy takes.
Since the user has observed (and approved) the policy’s
actions for states in Cpi , she should trust the robot in case
(2). In case (3), s is a false-negative critical state that the
end-user forgot about when approving this policy. Since this
is a critical state that the policy does not know is critical,
she should take control from the policy immediately.
If the user had not been able to observe how the policy acts
for states in Cpi , then she would not be able to distinguish
between when she absolutely must take control (states in
case (3)), and when she should not but may be tempted to
(states in case (2)).
I trust this robot. I would deploy this robot. I think this robot needs my help.
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Fig. 3. Ratings for Likert statements in Sec. IV, averaged across participants in each condition. Higher ratings mean higher agreement.
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Fig. 4. Participants’ yes/no responses for whether they would take control of the policy at a particular query state (from Fig. 2). A ? indicates that
this is a state in which participants should choose to take control, based on the critical states they observed. Results for s1 and s2 are omitted—people
overwhelmingly chose to not take control, regardless of which condition they were in.
IV. USER STUDY: IMPACT OF CRITICAL STATES
We begin by investigating how human end-users draw
conclusions after observing the critical states of a policy,
and how they respond to different errors (i.e., false positives,
false negatives, or incorrect actions) in these critical states. In
order to explore this in a systematic way, instead of obtaining
critical states from trained policies, we construct sets of
critical states where each set has at most one error. From this
we can learn, for example, how much seeing a false-positive
critical state impacts trust, versus seeing an incorrect-action.
Later, in our main user study (Sec. V), we expose end-users
to critical states from actual trained policies.
A. Experiment Design
The study consists of three phases. In the query phase,
we first introduce participants to the task and ask them, for
a handful of states, whether they consider it critical to take
a particular action in that state (Fig. 2, top row). This is to
get a sense of what Ch is across participants. In the exposure
phase, we introduce participants to a policy, for instance by
showing them its critical states. Finally, in the test phase,
we ask participants whether they would take control from
the policy, for each of the same states as in the query phase.
Domain. We chose a straightforward task with clear critical
states: Pong. In Pong, a ball bounces back and forth between
two paddles, and the goal is to use your paddle to hit the ball
past your opponent’s. So states in which the ball is headed
back toward your opponent are non-critical, since it does not
matter much how you move your paddle. In contrast, states
in which the ball is heading toward your paddle and has
almost reached it are critical.
Manipulated Variables. We manipulate the set of critical
states Cpi shown to the participant. We construct five options
for Cpi—correct, false-negative, weak-false-positive, false-
positive, and incorrect-action—that cover all the possible
problems with a particular policy’s critical states (Fig. 2). In
the baseline condition, instead of showing the participant a
set of critical states, we simply give them a summary statistic
of the robot’s performance: “this policy wins in 95% of
cases.” This establishes a baseline of how much participants
trust policies for Pong that are reasonably good.
Dependent Measures. We are interested in whether ob-
serving a set of critical states leads participants to develop
appropriate trust in the policy that generated those critical
states. We measure trust in two ways: subjectively with
five-point Likert questions, and objectively with which test
phase states participants choose to take control from the
policy in, and whether those are correct (i.e., in Ch and
either not in Cpi , or in Cpi but as an incorrect action). This
test phase simulates execution-time: after the end-user has
already chosen to deploy the policy, and is now supervising
it.
Hypothesis.
H1. When Cpi contains false-negative, false-positive, or
incorrect-action critical states, users are less inclined to trust
the policy pi, compared to if its critical states match Ch
perfectly (i.e., the correct condition).
H2. In states that are critical (i.e., in Ch), participants will
take control if a policy pi’s critical states Cpi suggest that
this policy will not choose the correct action in this state.
For example, since the false-negative Cpi for Pong is missing
critical states in which the paddle needs to immediately move
upward to hit the ball, this should lead participants to take
control in similar states at execution time (e.g., query state
s5). But, they should not take control at state s6, since the
false-negative Cpi includes a similar critical state and chooses
the right action.
Subject Allocation. We used a between-subjects design. We
ran this experiment on a total of 72 participants across the
six conditions, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The
average age of the participants was 31.4 (SD = 6.7). The
gender ratio was 0.32 female.
B. Analysis
Subjective. We asked participants how much they trust
the robot, whether they would deploy it, and whether they
thought the robot needed their help (Fig. 3).
We found a significant difference between incorrect-action
and correct for all three subjective measures (Student’s t test,
p < 0.0001). However, false-positives and false-negatives
did not decrease users’ perception compared to correct (the
trend is in the right direction for the false positives). This
may be because Pong is a relatively simple domain, which
makes humans more inclined to give policies the benefit of
the doubt, in terms of being able to generalize to other critical
states (in the case of the false-negative Cpi).
Objective. We also asked participants, for each of the six
query states (Fig. 2), a yes/no question for whether they
would take control of the policy at that state (Fig. 4). In the
query phase, participants agreed that of the six states, only
s5 and s6 are truly critical (i.e., in Ch). We see that overall,
across all conditions, participants tend to take control in these
two critical states, and not in the others. This supports our
assumption that humans will tend to only take control of
policies in states that are within Ch.
However, this also indicates that participants are taking
control even when it is not necessary. For instance, users
who saw the correct Cpi saw it act correctly in states similar
to both critical query states, but still almost half of users
choose to take control in that state.
On the bright side, we saw a number of trends in line with
our hypothesis. First, we do notice that for these two critical
query states, users tend to be less likely to take control after
seeing correct Cpi , compared to just being told a summary
statistic about the policy, in the baseline condition.
Second, participants in the incorrect-action condition
again indicated low trust in the robot, by choosing to take
control more often, even in state s3, which is only weakly
critical. We found participants chose to take control signifi-
cantly more in the incorrect-action condition than the correct
condition for s3 (Student’s t, p < 0.01) and s5 (p = 0.05).
Third, participants who saw false-positive and false-
negative critical states actually tended to take control more
often than those who saw correct ones, suggesting that they
did pick up somewhat on the problems indicated by Cpi (with
weak significance, for s5 and s6, p = 0.11).
Summary. Overall, participants responded most strongly to
critical states that reveal incorrect actions. There, they would
intervene before deployment. For false negatives, they would
tend to take control away from the robot more compared to
participants who saw correct critical states. False positives
only benefited from slight improvements in how much par-
ticipants would take control, though at the same time false
positives are the smallest of errors, as we discussed in Sec.
III.
V. USER STUDY: UTILITY OF CRITICAL STATES
Our previous study analyzed how people respond to dif-
ferent errors that critical states might reveal. In our main user
study, we evaluate the utility of showing the critical states
of a policy pi against other options of exposing end-users to
the policy, in terms of establishing appropriate trust.
We train two neural network policies for a driving domain,
and hypothesize that critical states are best at helping people
figure out which one is better. We train these policies
using SAC, and use Gaussian mixture policies with four
components [24].
In practice, critical states in Cpi may be very similar to each
other, so instead of showing all states in Cpi to the human,
we first cluster these states (with k-means++) and then show
the policy’s behavior in the most critical state from each
cluster. We take advantage of the fact that neural network
policies learn hidden-layer feature representations, and use
the output of the last hidden layer as features for clustering.
Concretely, we collect 10,000 timesteps by rolling out each
policy, cluster the 10% most critical states into ten clusters,
and show the most critical state from each cluster. So, we
end up showing ten critical states per policy.
A. Experimental Design
This study consists of the same three phases as the
previous study.
Domain. We train policies to drive in a top-down driving
simulator that mimics highway driving. The goal of the pol-
icy is to navigate down this road while passing other, slower
cars. Car dynamics follow the bicycle vehicle model [26].
The state space consists of an indicator for which lane
the robot car is currently in, its position and heading, and
the relative positions, heading, and speed of other nearby
cars. The action space is continuous and one-dimensional,
in the range [−1, 1]; it corresponds to the change in steering
angle.2 The reward function encourages forward progress and
2We discretize this action space evenly into 200 possible actions, in order
to compute critical states using the learned action-value function.
Query States
Critical States Critical States
Fig. 5. The query states and a subset of the ten critical states Cpi shown in our main user study. The policy controls the steering of the yellow car. Query
states s1 and s2 are not critical, but the rest are.
I trust this robot. I would deploy this robot. I think this robot needs my help.
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Fig. 6. Ratings for Likert statements in Sec. V, averaged across participants in each condition. Higher ratings mean higher agreement.
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0
1
2
3
4
5
ra
ti
ng
*
Perception Toward Robot (cont.)
Fig. 7. Ratings for Likert statements in Sec. V.
penalizes getting close to other cars, being off-center in the
lane, turning, and steering sharply.
Manipulated Variables. We manipulate two variables: how
a user is exposed to the policy, and the quality of the policy.
For exposure type, we compare our approach of showing
critical states to two baselines: showing a one-minute rollout
of the policy, and showing how the policy acts in random
states, rather than critical ones. These two baselines are
meant to approximate the states a user would happen to
encounter as she observes and interacts with the robot over
time.
For the quality of the policy, we have a policy piA
trained for 10,000 iterations, and another policy piB that
is trained for only 3,000 iterations. Both policies achieve
similar performance on the task: piA averages one crash per
700 timesteps, and piB averages one crash per 640 timesteps.3
But piB fails in a few simple traffic scenarios, that piA has
learned to navigate successfully—including query states s5
and s7 (Fig. 5).
3Note that since the agent can only steer, and the other cars surrounding
the agent are all driving slower than it, it will often encounter situations
where crashes are inevitable.
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Fig. 8. Participants’ responses for whether they would take control of the policy at a particular query state (from Fig. 5). Results for s1 and s2 are
omitted, since people overwhelmingly chose not to take control, regardless of which condition they were in.
Fig. 5 shows a subset of the ten critical states per policy.
Looking closely at the critical states of policy piB (Fig. 5), we
see the rightmost two states are false-positives, whereas all
the critical states of policy piA look reasonable. On average,
the critical states of policy piB are also of simpler driving
scenarios, which suggests that it may not be able to handle
more challenging ones.
Dependent Measures. We keep the same dependent mea-
sures as in the previous user study (Sec. IV), except we add
two Likert questions that ask participants more specifically
about how much they trust the policy with respect to critical
states, and change the yes/no question for taking control to
a five-point Likert question where higher means more likely
to take control.
Hypothesis. Showing users the critical states of a policy
establishes appropriate trust, compared to other approaches
of exposing users to policies. Appropriate trust, in this
setting, means that participants trust piA over piB , both in
their Likert responses and in how often they choose to take
control from the policy.
Subject Allocation. We used a between-subjects design
for exposure type, and within-subjects for policy quality to
reduce variance. We ran this experiment on a total of 60 par-
ticipants across the three conditions, recruited via Amazon
Mechanical Turk. The average age of the participants was
32.5 (SD = 6.7). The gender ratio was 0.27 female.
B. Analysis
Subjective. We see that across all five questions, users who
have seen the critical states of both policies tend to favor
policy piA, the better one (Fig. 6, Fig. 7). This trend is also
visible for participants who see a one-minute rollout of each
policy, but not as consistently. In contrast, when participants
see how the policy acts in randomly-selected states, they
rate policies piA and piB similarly, indicating that their trust
is incorrectly calibrated.
We ran a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA, with ex-
posure and policy quality as factors and user ID as a random
effect, for each item except the question on agreement. We
observe a weak interaction effect between exposure and
policy quality for the question on trust (F(2,57) = 2.37,
p = 0.1). We also ran a post-hoc Tukey HSD for each item,
which confirmed the trend that participants in the critical-
states condition favor the better policy, but this was not
statistically significant.
We ran a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, with policy
quality as a factor and user ID as a random effect, for
the question on agreement with critical states, and found a
significant effect (F(1,19) = 7.92, p = 0.01).
Objective. We asked participants, for each of the query
states (Fig. 5), whether they would take control from the
policy at that state. Participants in the critical-states condition
consistently choose to take control more in the case of the
worse policy, piB . We do not see this trend in either of the
two baseline conditions (Fig. 8).
We also see that across all critical query states (s3 through
s9), participants who saw the critical states of either policy
are more likely to trust that policy and not take control of
it, compared to participants who saw either a rollout of the
policy or how it acts in randomly-selected states.
We ran a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA for the
combination of participants’ responses across all seven crit-
ical query states, and find a significant effect exposure
(F(2,57) = 5.57, p = 0.006) and a significant interaction
effect for exposure and policy quality (F(2,777) = 5.30,
p = 0.005). We then ran a post-hoc Tukey HSD, which
showed that when participants see the critical states of piA
and piB , they take control significantly more for policy piB
(p = 0.001), but this is not true for either of the baseline
conditions.
This suggests that by showing human end-users the critical
states of a policy, we not only lead them to trust the policy
more, but also enable them to appropriately calibrate their
trust for good and not-as-good policies.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our user studies suggest that showing the critical states of
a policy is a promising approach for not only building trust
in the policy, but also for revealing whether it is trustworthy
in the first place. This can be applied to any policy trained
with a maximum-entropy-based approach.
The question is, what if a policy has incorrect critical
states, but it performs very well, at least in the training
environment. Should we trust this policy? Or should we not
trust it, because the fact that it has incorrect critical states
implies that it does not truly understand the task? This is an
open question for future work. Our hunch is that the latter
is true—if a policy’s critical states do not make sense, there
are likely states (outside the training distribution) that it will
not be able to generalize to.
The primary drawback of our approach is that it places
significant responsibility and mental burden on the human
end-user. For instance, we assume this end-user has domain
knowledge about the task; this is likely true for supervising
a self-driving car or robots in a factory, but might not be
true for more complex tasks. In addition, identifying false-
negative critical states requires the end-user to generalize cor-
rectly about what other states the robot considers as critical,
given the ones they saw. One way to address this limitation
is to reason about how humans do this generalization, and
show the end-user how the robot acts in additional states
(critical or not) to correct their understanding.
Nonetheless, this approach of showing critical states is
a step toward giving human end-users a better chance of
knowing whether or not to deploy a robot, and when to take
control during deployment.
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